Representation

W.J.T. Mitchell’s article on “Representation” in Critical Terms for Literary Study begins with this observation.

Man, for many philosophers both ancient and modern, is the “representational animal,” homo symbolicum, the creature whose distinctive character is the creation and manipulation of signs—things that “stand for” or “take the place of” some­thing else.

For Christians, human beings are made imago Dei. Before they symbolize, they are symbols: representations or images of God.

This theological context helps clarify what’s missing from Mitchell’s next statement.

[R]epresentation has been the foundational concept in aes­thetics (the general theory of the arts) and semiotics (the general theory of signs). In the modern era (i.e., in the last three hundred years) it has also become a crucial concept in political theory.

Representation is a foundational concept in Christian theology, and the importance of Christ and the Bible to western aesthetics, semiotics, and political theory is no less crucial.

Mitchell concludes with a sober assessment of representation’s limitations.

Every representation exacts some cost, in the form of lost immediacy, presence, or truth, in the form of a gap between intention and realization, origi­nal and copy.

To which loss we should reply, by what standard? Presuppositions matter. The critic’s metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical commitments will affect that measurement.